A systems engineering study of global positioning system installation onto Army aircraft by Grekoski, Edward D.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1995-12
A systems engineering study of global positioning
system installation onto Army aircraft
Grekoski, Edward D.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/31316
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 
THESIS 
A SYSTEMS ENGINEERING STUDY OF 
GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM 
INSTALLATION ONTO ARMY AIRCRAFT 
by 




John T. Dillard 
David V. Lamm 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
19960402 118 JEETC 32ED1 
THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST 
QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE 
COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC 
CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT 
NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO 
NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY. 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data 
sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other 
aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and 
Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) 
Washington DC 20503.  
1.     AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) REPORT DATE 
December 1995 
3.     REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master's Thesis 
4.    TITLE AND SUBTITLE A SYSTEMS ENGINEERING STUDY OF 
GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM INSTALLATION ONTO ARMY 
AIRCRAFT. 
6.    AUTHOR(S) Edward D. Grekoski 
FUNDING NUMBERS 
7.     PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 




9.     SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10.   SPONSORING/MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11.   SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILrTY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the systems 
engineering effort by the Aviation Research and Development Activity (AVRADA), the 
Airborne Engineering Research Activity (AERA), and support contractor DOSS to 
install the Trimble Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver onto Army helicopter 
platforms.  This study is an example of a successful systems engineering effort to install 
a non-developmental item (NDI) onto existing aircraft platforms in response to an urgent 
requirement created by the deployment of aircraft for Operation Desert Shield. 
14.   SUBJECT TERMS Systems Engineering, Global Positioning System 15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  107 
16.   PRICE CODE 
17.   SECURITY CLASSIFICA- 
TION OF REPORT 
Unclassified 
18.   SECURITY CLASSFI- 
CATION OF THIS PAGE 
Unclassified 
19.   SECURITY CLASSIFICA- 
TION OF ABSTRACT 
Unclassified 
20.   LIMITATION OF 
ABSTRACT 
UL    • 
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 298-102 
11 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
A SYSTEMS ENGINEERING STUDY OF GLOBAL POSITIONING 
SYSTEM INSTALLATION ONTO ARMY AIRCRAFT 
Edward D. Grekoski 
Captain, United States Army 
B.A., Rutgers University 1985 
Submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 




NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 1995 
'       John T. Dillard, Principal Advisor 
David V. Lamm, Associate Advisor 
^=C~ 
Reuben T. Harris, Chairman 




The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the systems engineering effort by the 
Aviation Research and Development Activity (AVRADA), the Airborne 
Engineering Research Activity (AERA), and support contractor DOSS to install the 
Trimble Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver onto Army helicopter platforms. 
This study is an example of a successful systems engineering effort to install a non- 
developmental item (NDI) onto existing aircraft platforms in response to an urgent 
requirement created by the deployment of aircraft for Operation Desert Shield. 
VI 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I .  INTRODUCTION 1 
A. GENERAL INFORMATION 1 
B. AREA OF RESEARCH 1 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 1 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 2 
E . METHODOLOGY  2 
F. BENEFITS OF STUDY 3 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 4 
II .  BACKGROUND 5 
A . PURPOSE 5 
B . THE REQUIREMENT 5 
C. GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM OVERVIEW 6 
D . ATCOM OVERVIEW 8 
E . C2SID OVERVIEW 9 
F. AEESA OVERVIEW 10 
G. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 13 
H . SUMMARY 14 
III .  PROJECT GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM STORY 15 
A. PURPOSE 15 
B. STRATEGY AND EXECUTION OF AIRCRAFT 
GPS ACQUISITION 15 
C. CUSTOMER SATISFACTION .41 
D. SUMMARY 42 
IV.  ANALYSIS 43 
A .  PURPOSE 43 
B. SYSTEM ENGINEERING ANALYSIS 43 
C. CUSTOMER SATISFACTION ASSESSMENT 57 
D .  SUMMARY 59 
vu- 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 61 
A .  CONCLUSIONS 61 
B .  RECOMMENDATIONS 66 
C.  AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 69 
APPENDIX A GPS ANTENNA MOUNT INSTALLATION; SOURCE: NAVIGATION 
DIVISION C2SID 71 
APPENDIX B TRIMPACK MOUNT AND SLEEVE ASSEMBLY INSTALLATION; 
SOURCE : NAVIGATION DIVISION C2SID 73 
APPENDIX C GPS ANTENNA AND TRIMPACK RECEIVER INSTALLATION; 
SOURCE : NAVIGATION DIVISION C2S.ID 75 
APPENDIX D QUICK REACTION GPS INSTALLATION PROTOTYPE SCHEDULE; 
SOURCE : NAVIGATION DIVISION C2SID 77 
APPENDIX E UH-1H/V INSTALLATION KIT CRITICAL EVENT SCHEDULE; 
SOURCE: NAVIGATION DIVISION C2SID 79 
APPENDIX F AH-64 INSTALLATION KIT CRITICAL EVENT SCHEDULE; 
SOURCE : NAVIGATION DIVISION C2SID 81 
APPENDIX G QRAG TEAM-KEY PERSONNEL/RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX; SOURCE: 
NAVIGATION DIVISION C2SID 83 
APPENDIX H PROTOTYPE INSTALLATION KIT CRITICAL EVENT SCHEDULE; 
SOURCE : NAVIGATION DIVISION C2SID 85 
APPENDIX I GPS INSTALLATION KIT-PRODUCTION SCHEDULE; SOURCE: 
NAVIGATION DIVISION C2SID 87 
LIST OF REFERENCES 89 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST •. 97 
viii 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. GENERAL INFORMATION 
The purpose of this chapter is to prepare the reader 
for the purpose and goals of this endeavor. This chapter 
will help orient the reader to assist in understanding the 
focus of this effort, why the subject is important, and what 
activities contributed information. 
B. AREA OF RESEARCH 
The topic for this thesis is "A Systems Engineering 
Study of Global Positioning System Installation onto Army 
Aircraft". The area of research will cover the issues that 
must be addressed when installing a non-developmental item 
(NDI) on an aircraft platform and the Systems Engineering 
required to produce, and install the system within time, 
cost, and performance parameters. This report will describe 
the process of the installation of Global Positioning System 
(GPS) for Army rotary wing aircraft by the Command and 
Control Systems Integration Directorate (C2SID) and the 
Airborne Engineering and Evaluation Support Activity 
(AEESA) . This thesis will be a case study that will tell 
the story of how the Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) 
quickly fielded GPS for Army aircraft in response to the 
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. This study will then 
analyze the NDI strategy and execution for strengths, 
weaknesses and lessons learned. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question was;  " What were the 
critical issues involved in the installation of GPS on Army 
aircraft and how were they resolved?".  Subsidiary Research 
Questions were the following; 
1. What was the aircraft integration strategy and how was 
it executed for GPS? 
2. What were the principal technical problems associated 
with installing GPS and how were they resolved? 
3. How effective was the management approach? 
4. How might the lessons learned from the GPS integration 
effort benefit future NDI insertions onto existing 
platforms? 
5. What was the history of the effort to install GPS onto 
Army aircraft in reaction to the Desert Shield/Storm 
requirement? 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This thesis will be a case study to identify issues and 
resolutions involved to install the Non-Developmental Item 
GPS on Army aircraft. This study is limited to the Trimpack 
GPS used in Army aircraft and C2SID's systems installation 
effort. Sources for this thesis are the Command and Control 
Systems Integration Directorate, Ft. Monmouth, N.J and the 
Airborne Engineering and Evaluation Support Activity 
(AEESA), Lakehurst, N.J. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis involved personal 
interviews conducted with Navigation Division personnel at 
C2SID, and quality assurance personnel at AEESA, Project 
GPS files at C2SID and AEESA were used in this study as the 
main reference to identify taskings, actions, and time 
frames. Desert Shield/Storm after action reports at C2SID 
were used to assess customer satisfaction.  A word search on 
Global Positioning System was conducted to add to the 
information data base. There is no classified material in 
this thesis. 
F.  BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The study of this systems engineering effort to insert 
an NDI capability onto currently fielded platforms will 
identify risks and tradeoffs that can occur.   The urgent 
requirement may lead to a more efficient systems engineering 
approach than is normally used to meet a need with respect 
to schedule,  cost,  and performance.   The planning and 
execution  of  this  acquisition  strategy  in  an  urgent 
environment may be applicable today.  The lessons learned 
may assist in streamlining todays acquisition process in 
some cases and lead to lower cost and faster' fielding of 
systems.    Today's  budget  constraints  may  make  the 
development of a capability too expensive and leave NDI the 
only affordable option.  Aircraft platforms are extremely 
valuable  to  battlefield  commanders  and  likely  to  be 
candidates for future NDI insertions due to the rapid change 
of rotary-wing technology in the commercial and military 
markets.   The application of Rotary Wing aircraft on the 
battlefield  is  a  combat  multiplier  for  battlefield 
commanders.   Rotary-Wing   aircraft   give   battlefield 
commanders the ability to quickly  move large numbers of 
soldiers over long distances day or night.  The ability for 
an aircraft to perform the mission is not unlimited.  The 
aircraft's design  limits  the aircraft's space,  maximum 
weight, and available power.  The pilot is limited by his 
ability to receive, process and act on information in his 
given flight environment.   The environment the aircraft 
operates in can be an additional limitation to performance. 
This thesis will capture the critical issues that must be 
This thesis will capture the critical issues that must be 
resolved to use NDI on aircraft as a solution to a user 
need. The strengths, weaknesses and lessons learned from 
Project GPS are critical to aviation material developers. 
Identifying and understanding the critical issues up front 
and early on will save time and help material developers 
make better tradeoffs to reach the optimum solution to 
install additional systems on aircraft. The strengths, 
weaknesses and lessons learned from Project GPS are 
important to aviation materiel developers. Civilian and 
military aviation related technology will move ahead and it 
is possible because of budget constraints or wartime 
deployments that NDI will be the only feasible solution to 
meet a critical user need. This thesis will be a single 
source reference for the systems engineering effort that 
took place to install GPS on Army aircraft. 
G.  ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II will give a brief overview of the 
requirement, organizations involved, GPS technology used, 
and systems engineering to establish understanding of key 
areas. Chapter III will describe the planning and execution 
of the integration effort while Chapter IV will analyze the 
strengths and weaknesses of this effort from a systems 
engineering perspective. Chapter V will present conclusions 
regarding the NDI integration strategy and its execution 
along with recommendations to improve NDI integration 
efforts in the future. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. PURPOSE 
This chapter will explain the events that created an 
immediate requirement for GPS capability on Army rotary wing 
aircraft. The technology behind GPS and the' limitations of 
the Army rotary wing aircraft navigational capability is 
discussed. An overview of the organizations that reacted to 
meet the challenge of installing GPS on all Army aircraft 
will be presented. Systems engineering and its relevance to 
project management and urgent acquisitions is explained. 
B. THE REQUIREMENT 
In August 1990 Saddam Hussein's Iraqi Army invaded the 
nation of Kuwait and initiated the Gulf War. The 82nd 
Airborne Division was immediately deployed to Saudi Arabia, 
to be followed by the 18th Airborne Corps, III Corps,VII 
Corps, reserve units and coalition forces. President George 
Bush had drawn a "line in the sand" by initiating operation 
Desert Shield. This operation ensured that any further 
expansionist goals the Iraqi's had would not be realized and 
the coalition forces would have time to increase forces to 
successfully mount a counter attack that would liberate 
Kuwait. The environment the U.S. deployed forces faced in 
the desert of Saudi Arabia was very different than that in 
the Continental United States (CONUS). Helicopter pilots 
had difficulty in determining precise aircraft position. 
The land was flat and undif ferentiable. There were few 
landmarks that could be used to determine position. Sand 
dunes would make up the contour of the land but would be 
constantly shifted by the winds. Navigational aids that 
were  common  in  the  United  States  including  VHF 
omnidirectional range (VOR), nondirectional beaconing (NDB), 
and Loran were not common throughout Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait. There was a need for the crew of any aircraft to 
know precisely where that aircraft was at all times 
throughout the area of operations. {Ref 1} The area of 
operations included not only Saudi Arabia, but additionally 
Kuwait and Iraq. Missions in which Army helicopters would 
take part included air assault operations, attack 
operations, reconnaissance. Joint Air Attack operations, and 
supply transport. All these missions required position 
awareness to fly an assigned route to an assigned location 
at a required time. In August 1990, the best technology 
currently available to immediately meet this requirement was 
Global Positioning System. 
C.  GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
The Global Positioning System is a space-based 
positioning system that can provide the user with precise 
position and velocity information. The system is used by 
both civilian and military users (dual use). Standard 
Positioning Service (SPS) is provided to commercial users 
and results in accuracies within 76 meters 50% of the time. 
The military and selective allies use Precise Positioning 
Service (PPS) that utilizes selective algorithms to give the 
military user greater accuracy, selective availability and 
anti-spoofing. The level of three dimensional position 
accuracy is within 16 meters for the authorized military 
users. {Ref 2} The signal transmitted by the satellites 
consists of two RF frequencies: LI at 1575.42 MHZ and L2 at 
1227.6 MHZ. The Clear Access(C/A) code is readily acquired 
by all GPS users and is a short code with less accuracy than 
the P-code. The C/A code is a Pseudo Random Noise (PRN) 
signal pattern that repeats every millisecond.  This is a 
rate much slower than the P-code rate and easier for 
receivers to lock on to. The P-code operates at 10.23 BPS 
and is long and difficult to acquire. The P-Code signal is a 
seven day long phase segment that has a complete phase cycle 
of 267 days and used for PPS. The Receiver of P-code is 
utilizing the PPS by first acquiring C/A code for initial 
code match and lock on. Next transfer to P-code is 
facilitated by an algorithm that phase shifts the receiver 
generated P-code to synchronize with the incoming point of 
the satellite generated P-code.{Ref 3} 
The GPS system is made up of three parts: the user; the 
space segment made up of the constellation of satellites 
orbiting the earth; the control segment that is run by the 
Air Force from Colorado Springs , Colorado with monitoring 
stations in Hawaii, Kwajalein, Ascesion, and Diego Garcia. 
The Control Segment directs satellite behavior to include 
orbit, transmission, power, and receiver availability . The 
receiver portion is the unit the commercial or military user 
operates to access position information on the ground from 
the satellite transmitters. {Ref 3} 
Trimble Navigation's Trimpack tracks up to eight 
satellites simultaneously that are referenced to determine 
precise position information. Position initialization is 
not required. The Trimpack uses the best four satellites 
that it can see for position determination. The system 
continuously tracks eight satellites, if available, and will 
always use the best four, as satellite positions change, to 
determine the best estimate of position. The Trimpack's 
memory is loaded to have an almanac that gives the orbits 
of all the satellites currently available at the time of 
loading . The Trimpack has satellite ephemeris that 
provides accurate satellite position information at all 
times.  This information is held in battery packed random 
access memory (RAM) and is updated hourly. When the 
Trimpack receiver is turned on it uses its memory of the 
last position and the known satellite orbits from the 
almanac to find the satellites the receiver believes to be 
above the horizon and then updates the receiver's new 
position. Each satellite generates its own Pseudo Random 
Noise (PRN) code that the receiver uses to positively 
identify satellites and differentiate one satellite from 
another. The amount of time required for first time fix 
after a receiver is turned on is as low as 1.5 minutes for 
brief power off periods and as high as 15 minutes for long 
power off periods where the satellite constellation has 
changed drastically. If a satellite signal is interrupted 
for more than 15 seconds, a frequency search is initiated to 
find the signal. The receiver may use almanac, ephemeris, 
and Doppler information to relock on the satellite or to 
provide estimates of the new projected satellite position 
that is utilized by the system to estimate the user's 
position.  {Ref 4} 
D.  ATCOM OVERVIEW 
The U.S. Army Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) was 
the U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM) located in 
St. Louis, MO, with a mission to develop sophisticated 
systems for use in Army Aviation and provide material 
management support for fielded systems. {Refs 5,11} This 
command is a major subordinate to the U.S. Army Materiel 
Command, Alexandria, VA, and has its own subordinate 
commands and elements at different locations throughout■ the 
United States and overseas. ATCOM leverages technologies at 
their various Research, Development and Engineering Centers 
(RDEC) for use in future aircraft designs. Examples of 
technology  research   that   occurs   are   rotor   craft 
aeromechanics, and advanced cockpit development for man- 
machine interface. Managing Army Aircraft systems through 
the entire system life cycle to include research and 
development, production, spare parts and material support, 
maintenance and retirement, is conducted by ATCOM. The AH-1 
Cobra, UH-1 Huey, OH-5 8 A/C Kiowa, and C-2 3 Sherpa, are 
examples of aviation programs managed by ATCOM. The Program 
Executive Officer (PEO) Aviation is separate from but 
collocated with ATCOM in St. Louis. PEO Aviation manages 
some aircraft systems under development or production to 
include the RAH-66 Comanche, AH-64A Apache, and UH-60 
Blackhawk. ATCOM does support and sustain PEO Aviation 
aircraft and when the program reaches production maturity 
the aircraft programs are transferred to ATCOM for long term 
sustainment. {Ref 5,11} 
E.  C2SID OVERVIEW 
The Command Control and Systems Integration Directorate 
(C2SID) was the Avionics Research and Development Activity 
(AVRADA) and is located at Fort Monmouth N.J, with a office 
collocated with NASA at the Langley Research Center in 
Hampton, VA. {Ref 5,11} C2SID's mission tasks include a 
wide variety of roles ranging from research and development 
to production and support of aviation equipment. Technology 
issues within C2SID's domain included Aviation Electronics. 
Systems Integration, Avionics Software Development and 
Support, Aviation Command Control and Communications, and 
Navigation. Integrating Avionics into aircraft cockpits was 
a niche for AVRADA. This organization was called upon to 
integrate numerous navigation, communication, and survival 
technologies onto aircraft platforms to enable aviators to 
navigate, communicate, and survive in current and future 
threat environments.    Aircraft Single Channel Ground Air 
Radio System (SINCGARS). the Digital Map Generator, the 
AN/PRC-112 Survival Radio, Integrated Communications, 
Navigation, and Identification Avionics (ICNIA), are 
examples of some of C2SID's efforts. 
C2SID's facilities include the Audio Acoustic Facility 
which reproduces the noise environment that aircraft operate 
in to assess the speech intelligibility of communication 
systems, and also to evaluate effectiveness of noise 
attenuation equipment. The Aviation Command and Control 
Ground Station simulates and provides command and control 
necessary to properly evaluate aircraft systems or 
subsystems in a tactical scenario. The Navigation Mobile 
Laboratory provides the capability to test navigational 
equipment prior to flight tests and actual performance for 
some ground and air flight tasks. AVRADA was one of the 
research and development activities under AVSCOM, but today 
C2SID is a directorate of the Communications and 
Electronics Command (CECOM) RDEC. (Ref 5,11) 
F.  AEESA OVERVIEW 
The Airborne Engineering Evaluation Support Activity 
(AEESA) was the Airborne Engineering and Research Activity 
(AERA) and is located at Lakehurst N.J. {Ref 1} It is 
commanded by an Army Lieutenant Colonel and made up of 
Government and contractor personnel who provide support to 
DOD customers. There is also a flight detachment located at 
Davison Army Airfield to support the Night Vision and 
Electronic Sensors Directorate, Ft. Belvoir, VA. AEESA 
provides aircraft, pilot support, aircraft maintenance, 
installation kit production, and aircraft modification 
support to customers. Aircraft at this activity have 
changed with time but today consist of UH-60 Blackhawk, AH- 
64 Apache, AH-1 Cobra, UH-1 Huey, RC-12 Guardrail,  C-23 
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Sherpa and the YEH-60 System Testbed for Avionics Research 
(STAR). Normally other aircraft required for modification 
or testing are provided by the customer or the ATCOM. This 
activity works out of a dirigible hangar with a tarmac 
adjacent to it and with Lakehurst Naval Air Station runway 
and control tower facilities. 
Contract Support is on-site and provides aircraft 
maintenance support at the Aviation Unit Maintenance (AVUM), 
Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM) levels and some 
Depot level repairs. They have the capability to produce 
level II specifications and have modern Computer Aided 
Design (CAD) equipment. Many customers come to this 
activity to evaluate their system on one of AEESA's 
aircraft. The contractor's capabilities include designing 
and fabricating kits required to install customer systems 
onto rotary-wing or fixed-wing aircraft. They also produce 
the installation kit and required aircraft modifications 
that must be performed for the new system installation. A 
Government Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) is on- 
site and overseas contractor performance to ensure quality, 
efficiency, and safety. Government Quality Assurance 
Representatives (QARs) assist by inspecting all 
installations, modifications, and repairs executed by the 
contractor personnel. Aircraft modification and non- 
standard installation design must be approved by ATCOM prior 
to that aircraft being released for flight. The QARs 
coordinate with ATCOM and send out documentation required to 
be evaluated. ATCOM makes the final approval or disapproval 
decision. Approvals are faxed to AEESA before any flight 
can take place. Supply facilities are on-site and consist 
of both contractor and Government support, Class IX 
supplies are ordered by the contractor to support customer 
projects. High priority and high dollar requisitions are 
reviewed and approved by the COR prior to execution. All 
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other classes of supplies are requisitioned by Government 
supply personnel. This unit pays for all parts to include 
Depot Level Repairables (DLR), and receives credit for DLRs 
turned in. Fixed and variable costs are assessed by 
Government personnel and customers are charged a fixed 
hourly rate. Time spent on customer projects by both 
contractor and Government personnel are captured on time 
cards by project code that are input into a computer weekly. 
Prior to initiation of customer support the customer sends 
funds via a Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request 
(MIPR). A Government Project Support Representative 
initiates a new project account and coordinates project 
status information to customers. The customer receives 
monthly statements from AEESA that show the project balance 
at the beginning of the billing period, what funds were 
spent for labor, materials, travel, flight support during 
the period, and the new balance. 
Flight Operations provide the resources and work areas 
pilots need to conduct mission planning to include, 
gathering current and future weather information, conduct 
flight planning, and evaluate aircraft performance 
capabilities and limitations. The pilots at this activity 
have thousands of hours of flight experience and are 
qualified to fly numerous rotary wing and some fixed wing 
aircraft. An Instructor pilot is responsible for pilot 
training to ensure pilots maintain proficiency in the 
aircraft they fly for all flight maneuvers required by the 
Aircrew Training Manual (ATM) and mission unique tasks that 
are demanded by the unit's mission, A unit Safety Officer 
oversees safety training and ensures that all activities 
performed by unit personnel are conducted by the book. 
AEESA's combination of civilian, military, and 
contractor personnel with the aid of facilities and 
equipment on-site provide one stop shopping to customers. 
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External engineering support is coordinated and obtained 
from the parent organization: C2SID. {Ref 1} 
G.  SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
Systems engineering  is defined by MIL-STD-499A as 
follows; 
Systems engineering is the application of 
scientific and engineering efforts to (a) 
transform an operational need into a description 
of system performance parameters and a systems 
configuration through the use of an iterative 
process of definition, synthesis, analysis, 
design, test, and evaluation; (b) integrate 
related technical parameters and ensure capability 
of all physical, functional and program interfaces 
in a manner that optimizes the total system 
definition and design; (c) integrate reliability, 
maintainability, safety, survivability, human and 
other factors into the total engineering effort to 
meet cost, schedule, and technical performance 
objectives. 
Objectives of systems engineering include ensuring that 
the system design captures all critical requirements for all 
system elements and that technical efforts are integrated to 
produce an optimally balanced design.{Ref 8} Systems 
engineering ensures a project is completed on time and meets 
all life cycle requirements. It defines the requirement on 
an iterative basis so the final product meets users needs. 
All user needs are considered and tradeoffs are made to 
optimize processes involved in the acquisition so the 
resulting system is producible in a timely manner, 
affordable, and meets the minimum user need. Systems 
engineering implements controls and documentation that 
capture cost, schedule, performance, and risk information 
that is provided to the decision maker. Timely information 
is critical for decision makers to have prior to their 
13 
decisions to commit resources or lock in a coarse of action. 
{Ref 7} Urgent acquisitions require an optimal systems 
engineering approach with respect to schedule and 
performance. Critical activities must be identified, 
scheduled, and resourced for the quickest execution 
possible. The acquisition strategy chosen must correctly 
assess risk to schedule and performance and field a system 
that meets minimum users needs. A project manager is not the 
expert in all the required activities that must occur and 
must lead his people in a team environment and manage 
critical activities to achieve success. 
H.  SUMMARY 
This chapter has briefly summarized key background 
information on activities involved in the effort to install 
GPS onto Army aircraft in response to the Desert 
Shield/Storm requirement. The technology required to allow 
GPS to function has been described along with the systems 
engineering approach to program management. Chapter III 
will give the history of the GPS installation effort. 
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III. PROJECT GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM STORY 
A. PURPOSE 
The execution of the NDI acquisition strategy chosen 
will be discussed in detail. This chapter will describe the 
sequence of events and interactions that occurred to create 
a way to install GPS on Army aircraft in response to Desert 
Shield requirements. Requirements analysis and problem 
solving of both anticipated and unanticipated problems will 
be discussed. We will look at the process, people, and 
systems engineering that resulted in successful, timely 
project completion. Tradeoffs to meet urgent tight schedule 
requirements will be looked at from a systems engineering 
perspective. 
B. STRATEGY AND EXECUTION OF AIRCRAFT GPS ACQUISITION 
1.  The Requirement 
Desert Shield began the first week of August 1990 with 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. On 22 August 1990 a meeting was 
held at AVSCOM to brief MG Williamson on AVRADA support for 
Desert Shield. MG Williamson directed AVRADA to proceed 
with engineering of A-Kits for GPS installation on Army 
aircraft. AVRADA was to develop the installation, training, 
logistical support concurrently with the engineering 
effort. {Ref 8}. At this time the Army Central Command 
(ARCENT) had not initiated a formal requirement for GPS in 
Army aircraft and there were no bill payers identified to 
pay for this effort. On 31 August 1990 a coordination 
meeting was held by AVSCOM with AVRADA. MG Williamson 
reiterated his support for the developing of installation 
kits to mount Trimble GPS on the Desert Shield Army aircraft 
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fleet. He directed a message be prepared and sent to MG 
Frix to validate the requirement and approve the proposal to 
equip the Army aircraft fleet with the Trimble GPS. Once MG 
Frix responded a message was sent to the Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) for allocation guidance. 
Contract support at AERA was suspended pending MG Frix's 
response. MG Williamson asked for an A-kit price breakdown 
and that the following considerations be considered for the 
engineering effort.{Ref 9} 
A. Ground to Air Interchangability- The Trimble GPS 
should have the ability to be quickly removed from aircraft 
and installed on different aircraft or ground vehicles. 
B. Batteries- Safe for flight. 
C. Location- Pilot input for location selection is 
essential, plus take into account location of crew storage 
of non-cockpit items,e.g. Mission Oriented Protective 
Posture (MOPP) gear, weapon, water. 
D. Kit Production- Should be complete not later than 
(NLT) 30 days from design completion. If AERA cannot meet 
this requirement AVSCOM should be notified immediately. 
E. Long Lead Time Items- AVRADA must develop a work 
around plan for long lead time items that may bottleneck kit 
production. 
The A-Kits were installation kits with an 
antenna/preamplifier that would allow the Trimble GPS to be 
installed on AH-64, AH-1, UH-60, OH-58, CH-47, and UH-1 
aircraft as an additional system.{Apps. A,B,C} 
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AVRADA sent a message to Program Executive Officer 
(PEO) Aviation requesting funding for the GPS integration 
effort. Deputy PEO Aviation COL Holcomb directed $225,000 
from the P7M Maintenance account be given to AVRADA to 
support the effort.{REF 9} This funding was anticipated to 
last through 30 September 1990 and cover the engineering 
efforts required during this time frame, but not production. 
The Statement of Work (SOW) developed by AVRADA called 
for developing prototype A-Kits for the following aircraft: 
AH-64, AH-1E/F, UH-60A/L, UH-60(Medevac), OH-58A/C/D, CH- 
47D, and UH-1H/V. This system was not to be integrated 
into the aircraft flight controls. A location for the 
receiver and antenna would need to be determined and all 
brackets needed for installation would have to be 
fabricated. The system would have to function off aircraft 
power (28VDC). Ground testing, EMC testing, operational 
flight test, loads and stress analysis, and electrical load 
analysis would need to be completed and documented for an 
Air Worthiness Release (AWR) to be given for that aircraft. 
Level II specifications would be prepared for each type of 
installation and commercial operator manuals would be 
reviewed and used if adequate. Installation instructions 
would be prepared for each airframe the Trimble GPS would be 
installed on via the A-Kit. 
2.  Selecting a Course of Action 
A GPS installation assessment was conducted between two 
possible approaches: the Quick Reaction GPS and the Stand 
Alone. Deputy Chief of Staff Operations (DCSOP's) concern 
over GPS installation time was the driving force behind this 
comparison. The Quick Reaction GPS was the current approach 
and would require from five hrs (AH-64) to 12 hrs (CH-47) to 
complete the A-Kit installation. Characteristics of this 
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approach include better satellite visibility since an 
externally mounted antenna was mounted on the aircraft roof 
at a level so the antenna will be even with the horizon 
during forward flight to optimize antenna performance. The 
Trimble GPS receiver is mounted inside the cockpit at a 
location that best suits the cockpit configuration and pilot 
needs. This location would also be optimal with respect to 
outside visibility and other safety requirements. This 
system would utilize organic aircraft power and not be 
dependent on receiver battery power to operate. Instant 
removal is achieved by a slide mount that allows the GPS 
receiver to be easily removed or installed. {Ref 11} 
The Stand Alone installation would mount the Trimble 
GPS receiver in the glare shield of the aircraft using 
Velcro to provide the simplest installation possible. 
Problems resulting from this installation include reduced 
satellite visibility due to blockages caused by the airframe 
encountered from the glare shield location and from the tilt 
of the Trimble built-in antenna to the horizon. A suitable 
location to mount the GPS using this method on the AH-1 
could not be achieved after a field of view analysis was 
performed by AVRADA/AERA. The Field of View Analysis 
examined the lateral and vertical field of view the pilot 
operating the GPS would have with the system mounted to the 
aircraft glare shield. The study also demonstrates the 
reduced system availability due to airframe caused signal 
blockage and not having an external antenna to see the 
satellites. {Ref 11} Safety was a serious deficiency because 
of the probability of not being given an Air Worthiness 
Release (AWR) due to the receiver mounted to the glare 
shield not meeting crash safety requirements. {Ref 11} If a 
crash occurred, Velcro would be the only restraint to stop 
the system from flying off the aircraft glare shield. This 
was considered a significant safety deficiency by AVSCOM 
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engineers who would give the AWR for the chosen installation 
design. Sun loading on the glare shield in a desert 
environment could result in the receiver and batteries 
encountering temperatures up to 200 degrees Fahrenheit. 
Table 1: FIELD OF VIEW/SATELLTE VISIBILITY CHART 
lateral FOV  horiz. FOV approx. time 3 or more 







122° 122° 142° l£ 
120° 120° 12S 13° 


















- Only location available in the AH-64A cockpit is 
behind the gunner's head. Only the pilot can see the unit 
and neither pilot can operate it at that location. 
- There is no room to mount the system on the glare 
shield for this aircraft. There is insufficient space above 
the gunners glare shield and the Heads Up Display (HUD) is 
at the area above the pilot's glare shield.{Ref 10} 
The temperature would have significant impact on the 
performance and life of the system's lithium battery's. The 
batteries life expectancy at 193 degrees Fahrenheit is 18 
hours. The battery has a thermal fuse that opens at 193 
degrees Fahrenheit to prevent explosion. {Ref 10} The fuse 
would prevent the explosion but not ensure continuous system 
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performance. The shortened battery life due to the high 
temperatures would create a logistical burden for lithium 
batteries and more frequent operator maintenance than if the 
system ran off aircraft power. AVRADA recommended to AVSCOM 
that the Quick Reaction program continue as described and 
the Stand Alone program be used in the desert as an interim 
solution for the requirement. {Ref 11} 
3.  Impact  of Research  and Development  (R&D)  and 
Contracting 
The first aircraft to have the Quick Reaction 
installation completed was the AH-64 Apache helicopter. 
{App. D} The engineering effort was complete by November 
1990. The speed achieved here was assisted by three events: 
past R&D for aircraft GPS receiver selection, coordination 
with Space command (SPACECOM) to acquire GPS receivers, and 
an already existing Letter Contract for the procurement of 
GPS receivers. In 1987, Joint Project Office GPS (JPO GPS) 
funded AVRADA $225,000 to evaluate commercial GPS receivers 
for use in Army aircraft. {Ref 11} This R&D evaluation 
effort conducted in 1987 saved time in 1990 because it 
identified the Trimble GPS receiver as the best choice of 
six evaluated for the GPS receiver in Army aircraft. This 
testing also identified GPS reception problems in all 
rotary-wing aircraft due to the motion of the main rotor 
blades. The effect of the main rotor on rotary-wing aircraft 
would cause the gain to jump. Trimble solved this problem by 
developing computer software to correct for reception 
problems caused by rotor movement and embedded the chip in 
the Trimble GPS. {Ref 11} SPACECOM was responsible for 
controlling the satellites essential for GPS operation. 
They coordinated with AVRADA launches to increase satellite 
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coverage and loaned them three Trimble GPS receivers to be 
used for engineering efforts in developing prototype 
installations. {Ref 11} Finally, the Air Force had an 
existing letter contract between JPO GPS and Trimble 
Navigation. {Ref 12} This contract could be modified to 
support the numbers of receivers needed to equip the 
aircraft fleet in the desert with the desired GPS 
capability.{Ref 12} 
4.  Requirements Definition 
AVRADA performed a requirements analysis of AVSCOM and 
DCSOP guidance to internally generate the requirement for 
the Quick Reaction GPS program. The requirements analysis 
took information received during AVSCOM meetings, messages 
from AVSCOM and DCSOPS, and broke down the perceived ARCENT 
requirement into smaller pieces so the different elements of 
AVRADA could start immediately on the Quick Reaction 
project. ARCENT did not validate the requirement for GPS 
receivers until December 1990. The ARCENT requirement that 
came in December was for a navigational capability 
independent of distance traveled and elapsed time in areas 
where landmarks are not readily available and the position 
update capability is critical for combat operations. The 
AVRADA generated requirement was as follows {Ref 13}: 
- Trimpack GPS Receiver- Location should consider 
pilot accessibility for operation and his ability to 
directly view the light display. Other considerations 
included 
- Non-interference with flight controls. 
- Clearance for crew to egress the aircraft. 
- System must be usable with pilot in MOPP IV 
posture. 
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- Must not interfere with operator's personal 
weapon. 
- System must not interfere with pilot's ability 
to see outside the cockpit during flight. 
- If possible, location should provide for ease of 
operation for both pilot and copilot. 
- Internal Battery- The system will run off 
aircraft power but a battery must be kept internally so the 
system can be removed from the aircraft and immediately be 
capable of performing its function. 
- Remote Antenna- The remote antenna will be hard 
mounted to the exterior of the aircraft zero degrees 
horizontal during level flight at a location that will 
maximize reception from available satellites. 
- Power Cable /Brackets- Will be installed in a 
manner that will ensure for easy installation and maximum 
performance. 
Air worthiness Documentation- Will be 
coordinated with AVSCOM Engineering, St. Louis. AVSCOM will 
send copies of all documentation to AVSCOM for approval of 
each aircraft modification. 
- Testing- Will verify that GPS installation will 
be adeguate to track satellites at different bank angles to 
allow for normal receiver performance. EMC testing will 
verify that no flight safety problems occur due to the 
modification. Test plans and reports will be required for 
each aircraft modification. 
Installation Instructions- Will be clearly 
written to adequately describe each aircraft modification. 
This information will be provided to an on-site AVSCOM 
representative for the purpose of writing Modification Work 
Orders (MWOs). 
- Engineering Drawings- Level II type commercial 
drawings will be required for each aircraft modification. 
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-Technical Manuals- There will be no changes to 
the current aircraft manuals. A Trimpack operator's manual 
will be provided for each aircraft modified. 
Kit Fabrication Requirement- Program will 
ensure that all A-Kits will be produced NLT 30 days from 
approval of prototype design. 
Integrated Logistics Support- The AVRADA 
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) office will coordinate 
with JPO GPS to prepare an ILS support plan. 
- Support Concept- Built in Test Equipment(BITE) 
will be used to verify proper functioning of the Trimpack 
receiver. The existing four year warranty will be utilized. 
Aviation Unit Maintenance (AVUM) maintenance will use BITE 
to identify defective Trimpack receivers. These receivers 
will be shipped to Depot and then to the manufacturer for 
repair and replacement. There will be no Depot Level support 
planned due the interim nature of the procurement. Spares 
must be planned for the quantity required. 
- Training- CECOM New Equipment Training (NET) 
Team will tailor the existing Trimpack receiver training 
plan to meet the airborne requirement. 
5.  Organization and Planning 
Integration efforts for each airframe required to be 
modified and installed with A-Kits were managed concurrently 
{App. D} and each effort had an integration effort milestone 
plan developed based on the perceived urgency that each 
specific airframe had for GPS capability. Enclosed are 
examples of two integration effort Milestone plans. {App. 
E,F} A Quick Reaction Airborne GPS Team was formed (QRAG 
Team). {App. G} The purpose of this team was to provide a 
streamlined  frame  work  to  facilitate  fast  problem 
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identification/solutions and result in a quicker fielding 
for all GPS aircraft installation kits. The normal 
organizational relationship between division, directorate, 
and higher headquarters was the following: 
FIGURE 1: TRADITIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 
The relationship between the divisions in AVRADA, the 
AVRADA director, and higher command AVSCOM was hierarchical. 
This made for stovepipe communications where information is 
screened vertically at different levels up and down the 
organizational chain of command. The implemented 







FIGURE 2: QRAG ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 
This new organizational communication structures goal 
was to acheive faster notificaton of requirement changes and 
quick resolution of project problems. An AVRADA 
representative was on-site at the Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC) in AVSCOM and coordinated directly with the 
QRAG team. {Ref 11} An AVRADA representative at the EOC 
would receive upgraded requirements from AVSCOM and pass the 
need directly to the QRAG team. The QRAG team is made up of 
experts from different divisions of AVRADA. The team was a 
horizontal integration across divisions of the required 
skills for project execution into one team The team members 
were organic to AVRADAs Navigation Division, Installation 
Division, and Product Assurance Division. Taskings were 
passed to team members via phone, written taskings, in 
person, or at QRAG meetings. The AVSCOM director made 
strategic decisions and would add resources to the existing 
effort if necessary. The on-site coordination with AVSCOM 
at the EOC, direct coordination between AVRADA/AERA 
personnel with AVSCOM engineers for safety issues, and 
AVSCOM personnel on-site at AVRADA for tech writing are 
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examples of vertical integration of effort between AVSCOM 
and AVRADA. {Ref 11} 
The location of the Trimpack receiver for the Quick 
Reaction project was determined at AERA by consensus from 
AVRADA  engineers,  AERA  Quality  Assurance  Specialists, 
Contractor personnel(at  AERA),  AERA pilots,  and AVSCOM 
engineers.    Once  consensus was  achieved   on receiver 
location by considering performance, MANPRINT, and safety, 
the installation kit was designed and fabricated.  This task 
was performed by the AERA contractor DOSS at Lakehurst, N.J. 
The contractor fabricated the kits first by taking aircraft 
measurements and making rough drawings of the installation 
kit.  These drawings would be given to the metal shop for 
fabrication.  The Level II specifications were being created 
concurrently with the  fabrication to save time and it 
reflected  the  confidence  of  the  contractor  and  the 
Government  Quality Assurance  personnel  in  the  receiver 
location decision. {Ref 11} 
6.  Flight Test 
The following flight test description is for evaluation 
of the Trimpack GPS receiver and external antenna 
/preamplifier. {Refs 11,14} This installation took place 
and was evaluated at Lakehurst N.J with AERA pilot's flying 
the aircraft, AVRADA engineers gathering data, and DOSS 
contract support to fabricate/install the system and 
maintain the aircraft. The process will be described for 
the UH-1 helicopter and was similar for all other airframes 
{App. H} that required installation/evaluation of the GPS 
modification to be used by the desert fleet. The process to 
complete and evaluate the prototype installation with 
schedule of concurrent activities is shown on {App. E}. The 
location selected for Trimpack installation on the UH-1 
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helicopter  was  on  the  copilot's  side  of  the  center 
pedestal.{App. D}   Antenna/Preamplifier location analysis 
was  conducted  by  AVRADA  engineers  to  mathematically 
determine the optimum location for installation with respect 
to signal reception.   The first location chosen for the 
antenna installation was on the left side of the aircraft's 
roof (engine hoist hole) on a 12 inch mast so the antenna 
would rise above the aircraft cowling.  Antenna Radiation 
Pattern tests were conducted at MAT 3, Hangar 5, Naval Air 
Engineering Center, NAEC, Lakehurst N.J.  A UH-1 equipped 
with the GPS and external antenna would sit on the compass 
rose facing zero degrees.  The Navigation Division van with 
a signal  generator  inside  and Rockwell  FRPA-3  antenna 
mounted on a four foot diameter ground plane on the van roof 
would transmit a test signal of 13 dbm on 1575 MHZ.  This 
signal was radiated from the roof of the van 40 feet from 
aircraft center.  The van would move clockwise 15 degrees 
maintaining the same distance from center and repeat the 
signal transmission. A spectrum analyzer was connected to 
the Antenna/Preamplifier to record field strength at each 
point.  The Flight Test consisted of flying the aircraft to 
known waypoints using Trimpack GPS information obtained in 
flight.  The pilot would then make a series of turns and 
then fly back to the waypoint.  After the second over flight 
of the waypoint the pilot would hover over the waypoint for 
a period of time.  After the hover the pilot would fly to 
another waypoint and repeat  this procedure.   The  last 
waypoint would be completed and then the pilot would fly to 
a designated return point for a final measurement to be 
followed by flight termination.   During this flight, an 
AVRADA engineer, would be in the back seat with a Grid 
computer connected to the Trimpack data port.  Data for the 
entire flight would be collected by the computer and then 
taken back to AVRADA for analysis. {Ref 11} 
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Antenna Radiation Pattern tests conducted at Lakehurst 
show a 21 decibel null {Fig 3} at the 45 degree azimuth 
caused by the rotor mast on the antenna/preamplifier 
installation. This was a serious deficiency because nulls 
of more than 10 decibels at azimuths greater than 30 degrees 
would seriously impact received signal strength. 
AVRADA/AERA decided to try mounting the antenna/preamplifier 
to the back of the wire cutter. {App. A} Antenna Radiation 
Pattern tests were conducted on the ground as was described 
for the first antenna installation. Additionally the 
aircraft main rotor blade was put in the north-south 
position and then the east-west position. Testing showed 
that when the blades were in the north-south position there 
were four nulls ranging from 3 to 7 decibels and when the 
blades were in the east-west position the nulls ranged from 
3 to 14.5 decibels. It was determined the rotor blades 
would cause a null that would range from 5.5 to 14.5 
decibels at 180 degrees. Nulls independent of rotor 
movement were found at 105, 210, and 330 degrees. In flight 
collected data were analyzed to determine north and east 
error, horizontal error at a hover, and altitude and time 
gaps at waypoints throughout the flight. The data for the 
first flight( 21 November 1990) of the wire cutter mounted 
antenna resulted in a minimum horizontal error of 
24.3meters, a maximum error of 84.2 meters and an arithmetic 
mean error of 37.6 meters. This error was higher than 
expected and was explained by the fact that only four 
satellites were visible during this flight, with several 
satellites rising and setting. This could have caused a 
masking effect that would cause poor geometry and make the 
receiver use old data longer while looking for clearer 
satellites.Using old data while looking for better 
satellites would case the larger than expected position 
error. 
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POLAR LOG CHART 
FIGURE 3: UH-1 SIGNAL RECEPTION CHART/ ENGINE HOIST 
MOUNTED ANTENNA/PREAMPLIFIER 
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The next flight on 28 November 1990 had a more desirable 
satellite configuration.   The accuracy achieved by the 
system was excellent compared to the prior flight.   The 
minimum horizontal error in  flight was 10 meters,  the 
maximum error was 33.4 meters, and the arithmetic mean was 
13.3 meters.   During these  flights the Trimpack would 
normally  update  position  every  1-3  seconds  with  some 
occurrences of time gaps between 7-15 seconds and a maximum 
time gap of 45 seconds.  The larger time gaps for position 
updating mostly occurred on the first flight.  Pilots were 
alerted to the fact that position information is old by the 
Trimpack flashing "OLD" on its visual display.   Altitude 
hold periods where the Trimpack did not update aircraft 
altitude occurred during both flights.  The longer periods 
were for the first flight ranging from 1 to 3 minutes.  Most 
of the altitude 'hold periods were far less than this on the 
second flight and the conclusion was that the satellite 
problem was caused by masking as in the 21 November 1990 
flight.    The  occurrence  of  altitude  hold  would  be 
communicated by the pilot by a  flashing  "2-D"  on the 
position page of the Trimpack visual display.  The better 
position  information  on  the  second  flight  and  the 
improvement  in  antenna  radiation  patterns  resulted  in 
selecting the wire cutter antenna/preamplifier installation 
as the standard for the UH-1 aircraft.   EMC tests were 
conducted on the ground and in flight to evaluate the GPS 
systems compatibility with other aircraft systems.   The 
evaluation was to check for interference that may be caused 
by electromagnetic interaction between the GPS system and 
other aircraft systems because of the close proximity.  All 
electrical systems were turned on and radio checks were made 
with each type of aircraft radio to check for interference. 
Navigational aids were also checked in-flight with known 
points to confirm satisfactory performance with the GPS 
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system operating at the same time. The EMC tests conducted 
for the UH-1 GPS installation did not find any problems 
during the ground and in flight evaluations. {Refs 11,13} 
7.  AERA Support 
Concurrently with the flight tests; DOSS was working at 
completing the Level II specification for the A-Kit showing 
the wire cutter mounted antenna/preamplifier installation. 
{Ref 11} DOSS needed to quickly finish the specifications 
so that the Technical Bulletin(TB) describing the time parts 
and people required to perform the installation could be 
written. This information was critical to instruct soldiers 
in the field the resources and procedures required to 
install this system onto an aircraft. The TB describing the 
installation of the A kit was written concurrently as kit 
production was taking place. Because AERA constantly 
coordinated with AVSCOM engineers the AWR approval was quick 
upon submittal of the Level II specification to the AVSCOM 
engineer responsible for that airframe. The result was that 
production could occur almost immediately. This process was 
repeated for each airframe and DOSS expanded production 
capacity by increasing to two shifts to meet production 
schedule deadlines. The special machinery required for 
fabrication of A kits were the bottleneck and more labor 
during the normal work day would not increase production due 
to limits in machinery capacity. Long lead time items not 
normally on hand were ordered at the end of September to 
support the entire anticipated Quick Reaction program 
effort. The list was reviewed and approved by a Government 
Quality Assurance Specialist on site at Lakehurst prior to 
the contractor submitting the requisition. This on-site 
coordination and review ensured response and checked the 
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accuracy of quantities and types of materials ordered by the 
Government. 
The contract in place at AERA was a multi-year Time and 
Materials contract. {Ref 1} The contract was a two-step 
sealed bid, multi-year contract where the Contracting 
Officer's Representative (COR) reviewed proposals for 
technical adequacy with the contracting officer awarding the 
contract to the low priced technically capable contractor. 
Small business was given a 10% price advantage over large 
businesses bidding on the contract. The RFP listed all the 
job categories and the amount of man-hours the Government 
anticipated needing. The contractor bid loaded rates that 
included profit in his proposal. The Government paid the 
contractor the amount of hours worked in a two week period 
times the labor category rates the contractor bid in his 
proposal. The limitation the Government had was that work 
assigned must stay within the job description of each labor 
category and the total amount of hours for each category 
could not be exceeded. The Government could immediately 
modify the contract to add hours to job categories that 
would exceed their threshold because of workload. The COR 
requested the contracting officer modify the contract to add 
hours to job categories that had greater man-hour 
requirements, than available in the contract. The 
contracting officer approved and a second shift was started 
to increase the production of A-Kits. The ability to 
quickly modifying the contact to increase available labor 
hours for some job categories by coordination with the 
contracting officer at CECOM, Ft. Monmouth N.J. provided for 
an immediate increase in production capacity when required. 
The Sheet Metal, Electrician, Draftsman, Avionics, Aircraft 
Mechanic, and Supervisor categories labor hours were 
increased to support the production and aircraft 
modification work efforts.  The COR changed task priorities 
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in response to changing shipping requirements and project 
support requirements. The work performed was within the 
scope of the contract and Government Quality Assurance 
Specialists conducted inspections on all completed work. 
The first Shipment of 200 UH-1 A-Kits occurred on 25 
January 1991 to be installed on aircraft in Southwest Asia. 
AERA (DOSS) produced kits for the UH-1H/V,ÖH-58A, CH-47D, 
AH-1F, and OH-58D {App. I}. The ability to produce A-kits 
for all aircraft simultaneously exceeded DOSS capacity so it 
was coordinated for Corpus Christi Army Depot to manufacture 
A-Kits for the AH-64 and Tobyhanna Army Depot to produce A- 
Kits for the UH-60A/L. Tobyhanna also provided for 
production of small amounts of A-Kits of other aircraft if 
AEESA could not make schedule. {Ref 1,11} 
8.  Night Vision Compatibility 
Night Vision Goggle compatibility is critical for a 
system to be useful in aviation night operations. Systems 
that do not consider this aspect of performance may be 
useless or even dangerous when operated at night. In 
December 1990, the QRAG team questioned the Night Vision 
Goggle (NVG) compatibility of the Trimpack installed on an 
aircraft glare shield or on the side of a aircraft center 
pedestal. {Ref 11} Testing was conducted on 10 January 1990 
at Night Vision Detachment, Ft. Belvoir, Va. {Ref 16} The 
results were that the three levels of lighting available on 
the Trimpack were not acceptable with the system mounted on 
a glare shield or to the side of acenter pedestal. The 
ANVIS 6 Night Vision Goggles(AVS-6) are extremely light 
sensitive. They work off the principle of amplifying 
ambient light received through two monocular tubes to create 
a visual display. The pilot and copilot both wear these 
goggles in flight at night and aircraft lighting is NVG 
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compatible or a filter is put over the light to make it NVG 
compatible. Cockpit lighting that is greater than 
acceptable levels can obstruct vision or temporarily shut 
down goggle operation. The installations evaluated failed 
in two areas. Trimpacks mounted to the glare shield are in 
the pilot's field of view. The intensity of the light was 
greater than normal luminance levels allowed when using 
NVGs. Normally luminance of .10 foot-lamberts or less is 
tolerated in a NVG posture. Test results produced luminance 
levels of .60 foot-lamberts with the Trimpack light 
intensity in the high position, .29 f oot-lamberts in the 
medium position, and .17 foot-lamberts in the high 
position.{Ref 15} These results were far outside the 
tolerable range for safe NVG operations. The Trimpack 
installed on the side of the center pedestal eliminated the 
field of view problem but caused the Trimpack display to 
appear on the wind screen of the aircraft to the pilots 
wearing NVGs. This image would block real images outside 
the aircraft from pilot viewing and be a distraction to both 
pilot and copilot. Next a filter used on SINCGARS displays 
was placed over the Trimpack display. The results were the 
display was NVG acceptable at the low light level but not at 
the medium and high light levels. AVRADA and American 
Engineering Laboratories (AEL) immediately initiated an 
effort to modify the Trimpack to correct these problems. An 
immediate and long term strategy to correct the deficiency 
in Trimpacks already in the Army inventory in the desert and 
those coming off the assembly line was needed. It was 
decided by AVRADA up front that the goal would not be to 
create a fix that was "ANVIS compliant". ANVIS compliant 
was defined as the system would meet MIL-85762A allowing the 
avionics equipment to be installed in any aircraft for use 
in night operations. The reduced goal was to find a fix 
that  was  "ANVIS  acceptable"  meaning  that  the  specific 
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installation  would  not  cause  significant  {Ref  16} 
distraction/vagradation  to  the  pilot  or  copilot  when 
installed in a particular aircraft.  On 17 January 1991 
AVRADA issued delivery order 022 to contract DAAB0 7-8 8-D- 
H030 for AEL to prototype a filter installation for the 
Trimble GPS.{Ref 17}  The prototype should be evaluated for 
chromaticity,  ANVIS radiance,  daylight  readability,  and 
light leak.  AEL was instructed to coordinate with Trimble 
Navigation to ensure for mechanical fit and to prepare a 
cost estimate for 200 kits NLT 1 February 1991, and 2000 
kits NLT 31 March 1991.   AEL prototyped a NVG filter 
installation (Fig 4) to be installed by the operator using 
an Allen wrench to screw on a filter into existing holes in 
the Trimpack.  This approach was used because it could be 
accomplished  guickly  without  modifying  the  existing 
Trimpack.  Finding the optimal filter was a more challenging 
endeavor.  On 15 January 1991 a test was performed at Night 
Vision using a SINCGARS filter with thickness increased from 
.04 inches thick to .08 inches and with a filter provided by 
Trimble manufactured by KOPP Glass.   Both filters seemed 
ANVIS acceptable with the KOPP filter slightly superior. 
{Ref 16} AEL also provided a prototype of a filter embedded 
into the Trimpack.  The prototype consisted of a KOPP filter 
pressed in between the back of the  Trimpack light display 
and the front of the Light Emitting Diodes (LED).   The 
prototype was tested and found to be ANVIS acceptable and 
acceptable for day use.  Trimble informed AVRADA that they 
were in the process of designing an embedded filter and the 
AEL glass filter prototype would not withstand performance 
in severe environments.  Additionally, Trimble was looking 
at  plastic  substitutes  to  reduce  the  possibility  of 
breakage.   On 18 January 1991, a meeting was held with 
AVRADA and AEL personnel at AEL's plant in Lansdale, PA. 
{Ref 16} The approach to make already produced Trimpacks NVG 
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FIGURE 4: ANVIS FILTER INSTALLATION 
1
 36 
T CM "0 
r 
2.2 s l l T 0-50-1 GG 1 
compatible was discussed and the external filter installed 
over the Trimpack light display was chosen to solve the 
immediate  problem.  The  consensus  was  that  the  filter 
installation kit should not require mechanical alterations 
to the Trimpack, and provide a seal between the filter and 
the Trimpack display screen.  The design used would have to 
consider the type of filter used and ensure that procurement 
of the filter could meet tight schedule requirements.  On 23 
January {Ref 16} AEL provided AVRADA a sample of the filter 
to be used for the installation kit.  This was a modified 
SINCGARS filter with adjusted thickness to optimize NVG 
utility.   AERA pilots found that there were significant 
deficiencies with the AEL provided filter.  Day flights with 
the  filter  installed  over  the  Trimpack  light  display 
resulted in limiting contrast between the display and its 
background  when  viewed  with  the  pilot's  naked  eye. 
Additionally, the display could not be read at all by the 
pilot when  flying with  the helmet  visor  in  the  down 
position.  This in-flight testing at AERA on 23 January 1991 
demonstrated that even though the filter made the Trimpack 
compatible  for  NVG  flight  operations,  it  would  be 
incompatible for day flight operations. {Ref 16}  The filter 
installation would have to be installed for night flights 
and removed for day flights.   A suggestion was made to 
change the filter installation to a flip type design where 
the display would have a hinge on one side and the pilot- 
could  flip the  filter down against  the Trimpack light 
display for night operations and flip the filter up for day 
operations.   {Ref 11}  The mechanical engineering changes 
would have a significant impact on the filter installation 
production rate and the consensus between AVRADA and AEL was 
to stay with the original prototype for the first 200 kits. 
Canadian Marconi was used as the supplier to AEL because 
their filter was used during the original tests. {Ref 17} 
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AEL's task to find a filter supplier to provide a 
filter that would make the Trimpack NVG compatible yet still 
suitable for day flights, meet a tight delivery schedule, 
and control cost was a difficult one. As of 7 February 1991 
three filter suppliers were being considered Canadian 
Marconi, Wamco, and Glar-Ban. The factors used to evaluate 
the filters was NVG radiance, Photopic Transmission, cost, 
and ability to deliver quickest. {Ref 17} NVG Radiance 
measured the brightness of the filtered display to ensure it 
was within the NVG acceptable range. The Photopic 
Transmission test evaluated the readability of the display 
during daylight conditions after the filter was placed over 
the organic Trimpack light display. The improved filter 
provided by Canadian Marconi was judged to be the superior 
filter. It had the best radiance figures and reduced 
photopic transmission by only 10%. {Ref 18} Canadian 
Marconi also had the most aggressive delivery schedule with 
the tradeoff of costing the most. The Glar-Ban provided 
filter had low photopic transmission that could result in 
the Trimpack display being unreadable by the pilot in low 
light day conditions such as dawn or dusk. Wamco' s filter 
was suitable for day and night operations, lower cost than 
Canadian Marconi, but would require two months for first 
delivery. Canadian Marconi could deliver 120 of the old 
filters on 15 February, 160 of the new filters on 22 
February, 100 more on 22 March, and the balance on 1 April. 
Glar-Ban was the low cost filter ($42 ea.), Wamco the next 
lowest ($72 ea.), and Canadian Marconi the high cost 
producer ($97.40 ea.). Canadian Marconi was chosen as the 
supplier to provide filters with gasket installed to AEL for 
use in the filter installation kit. The QRAG team decided 
the combination of high quality and quick delivery was 
subjectively judged to overcome the higher cost required in 
light of the urgency to field the filter installation kits 
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to Trimpacks in the desert.  The CECOM contracting officer 
sent a letter to AEL on 12 February directing procurement of 
material required to complete 1500 filter installation kits 
from Canadian Marconi.  On 22 February 1991 Canadian Marconi 
just delivered the new filters and the urgency caused MG 
Williamson to ask the president of AEL "turn up the burner" 
to complete the delivery order on the filter installation 
kits. {Ref 19} The shops at AEL worked the 23rd and 24th 
installing the  filter into the old design kits.   The 
remainder of the 1500 new filters would go on a new Snap-On 
type filter cover that had a gasket to provide a seal 
between the filter and the Trimpack light display.  This new 
design filter installation kit was displayed to AVRADA by 
AEL on 22 February 1991, at the AEL plant in Lansdale, PA. 
AVRADA gave permission to proceed with production of the new 
design.  The new snap-on design allowed for easier removal 
of the ANVIS filter from the Trimpack for day operations, 
compared to having to use an Allen wrench to install or 
remove the four screws in the old design.  Black anodizing 
of installation parts were required to minimize reflections, 
prior to shipping and AEL was directed to complete the 
action  or  coordinate with AVRADA to  have  it  done  at 
Lakehurst.  Delivery of the filter installation kits began 
in March 91. {Ref 19} 
9. Production Summary 
The Quick Reaction GPS program resulted in 1,922 A-Kits 
being produced between January 91 and April 91. {App. 1} 
Operation Desert Storm was supported by shipping 425 UH- 
1H/V, 100 UH-6 0A/L/EH-6 0, and 5 0 OH-5 8A A-Kits and 200 ANVIS 
filter installation Kits. In March 91 an additional 50 OH- 
58A A-Kits and 217 ANVIS filter installation kits were 
shipped to Saudi Arabia.   In March 91 Operation Provide 
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Comfort was supported by shipping 65 UH-60A/L, 18 AH-64A, 8 
OH-58C, 20 CH-47D A-Kits and 119 ANVIS filter installation 
kits to units in Germany deploying to the desert. There 
were 80 ÜH-1 A-Kits at Defense Distribution Region West that 
had been previously shipped to the field. The success of 
the system in Operation Desert Storm and the lack of GPS 
still existing in much of the Army's rotary-wing fleet 
brought GPS to the attention of the Council of Colonels(COC) 
meeting 10 October 91.{Ref 20} The COC decision was to 
continue to use the Small Lightweight GPS receiver (SLGR), 
which is the Trimpack receiver mounted on an aircraft via 
the A-Kit, as the interim GPS receiver for 50% of the Force 
Package 1 contingency corps aircraft. This requirement 
resulted in the need to produce 688 total additional A-Kits 
more than what was available for the UH-1H/V, OH-5 8A, OH-5 8D 
aircraft and 1288 antennas required for- the A-Kit 
installation. {Ref 20} In December 1992, AERA responded to 
requirements for 10TH Mountain Division aircraft to be GPS 
capable for Operation Restore Hope. AERA installed A-Kits 
in 10 OH-58A aircraft at Lakehurst and deployed a team of 
Government quality assurance and contractor personnel to 
install the A-Kits on 16 UH-60 Blackhawk aircraft at the 
Sikorsky plant in Bridgeport, CT. 
Additionally, in January 93 AERA deployed a team to 
install A-Kits on 12 UH-60 aircraft for the 1ST Cavalry, Ft. 
Hood, TX, prior to their deployment to Kuwait. 
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TABLE   2:   A-KIT  PRODUCTION/DELIVERY   INFORMATION  CHART 
AIRCRAFT   «FABRICATED   «SHIPPED   «SHIPPED   «SHIPPED   «AVAILABLE 
ODS OPC OTHER 
UH-IH/V 425 425 0 O 80 
UH-60A/L/EH-60 450 lOO 65 25 260 
OH-58A 50 50 0 0 0 
OH-58D 17 0 5 0 12 
OH-58C 300 0 8 0 292 
CH47-D 175 0 20 0 155 
AH-IF 140 0 0 0 140 
AH-64A 280 0 18 18 244 
ANTENNAS 650 0 0 22 628 
ANVIS FILTER 
KITS 1700 417 119 108 1056 
#FABRICATED - A-KITS 
ODS - Operation Desert Storm 
OPC - Operation Provide Comfort 
C.  CUSTOMER SATISFACTION 
Customer satisfaction information was collected by 
AVRADA from testimonials received from soldiers 
participating in the war using GPS. {Ref 26} Additional 
soldier testimonials were received from Trimble. Higher 
level leadership testimonials were received from the GPS 
project office. {Ref 26}  A GPS performance assessment was 
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presented at the Fourth International Technical Meeting of 
the Sattellite Division of The Institute Of Navigation on 
December 12, 1991. {Ref 25} 
D.  SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented key decisions and events 
that took place in relationship to the installation of GPS 
onto Army aircraft in response to an urgent requirement. MG 
Williamson's direction to go forward with the GPS aircraft 
installation effort, AVRADA's requirement definition, 
formation of a QRAG Team, and selecting the Quick Reaction 
GPS strategy were key decisions. Key events include 
evaluation of commercial GPS receivers in 1987, A-Kit 
development, flight testing, production, and identifying the 
GPS night vision compatibility problems. Chapter IV will 
analyze the decisions made from a systems engineering 
perspective for strengths and weaknesses. User feedback and 
feedback from higher leadership will also be evaluated. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
A. PURPOSE 
This chapter will analyze system engineering decisions 
made and their execution toward completing the GPS 
installation effort on Army rotary-wing aircraft. The 
strategy chosen, organizational structure, and problem 
solving actions will be evaluated. Finally, customer 
satisfaction will be assessed from after action reports and 
statements that were captured after Operation Desert Storm. 
B. SYSTEM ENGINEERING ANALYSIS 
1.  Strategic Decision making 
MG Williamson's decision to go forward with the 
development of Trimpack GPS installation kits for Army 
aircraft without a validated ARCENT requirement or 
identified bill payers demonstrated good judgment and strong 
leadership. He directed AVRADA to begin development on 22 
August 1990, but a validated ARCENT requirement was not 
received until December 1990. Project initiation at this 
later date would have been too late to complete the 
development and production effort to support the desert 
fleet. The early strategic decision that was made allowed 
AVRADA to start work immediately on the effort, but risked 
not totally capturing the user need in the final design. 
This risk was low because of the wealth of experience of the 
QRAG members on the various disciplines that would be 
integrated to define requirements, design, locate, and 
fabricate the installation kits. The validated requirement 
that  finally  arrived  for  a  navigational  capability 
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independent of distance traveled and elapsed time in areas 
where landmarks are not readily available supported AVSCOM's 
decision to install GPS on Army aircraft. The strategic 
decision made up front and early on gave planning time, 
clear direction and strategic vision to AVRADA of the scope 
of work needed to be accomplished. 
2.  QRAG Team 
The urgent requirement forced AVRADA to find a way to 
quickly install GPS onto Army aircraft. AVRADA realized the 
urgency of the situation and the need to expedite the 
development and production phases. The formation of the 
QRAG team was an excellent management decision to facilitate 
quick communication and problem solving. This approach 
streamlined the people involved and allowed many development 
decisions to be made at the QRAG team level. The QRAG team 
horizontally integrated functional support and vertically 
integrated input from AVSCOM and the user. The strengths of 
the QRAG team approach are fast decision making and 
requirement identification. The on-site representative at 
AVSCOM gave the QRAG team quick notification of requirement 
changes. The QRAG team had the ability to make problem 
solving decisions and to coordinate directly with AVSCOM on 
safety and requirement issues. The experience of the team 
members justified this empowerment. Another way of 
organizing would be to designate a Program Manager to be 
responsible for the success of the GPS installation effort 
and rely on matrix support to complete the required 
development activities. The advantages of this type of 
approach is that functional areas can each organize their 
people to meet all program demands for people and other 
resources in an efficient manner. The disadvantage is the 
functional supporter works for the functional manager and 
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not for the program manager. The Program Manager must rely 
on his people skills to get things done rather than 
authority. The Program Manager can send back his functional 
support and contract support if he has the funds and the 
capability exists in the commercial market. The functional 
manager will prioritize people and resources to meet his 
priorities that may or may not increase timely support for a 
given program. Personnel turnover is always a risk if the 
functional manager decides to move key functional support 
personnel to a different program and replace them with less 
experienced personnel. 
The QRAG team approach put all critical functional 
supporters under one leader. This eliminated the risk of a 
functional manager changing key people or re-prioritizing. 
The team personnel responded to one person , the team 
leader. Supporting personnel are not caught in between a 
Program Manager and functional support manager. The team 
approach focuses all critical personnel efforts on one 
program and places the burden of success or failure firmly 
on the team. The authority to control team personnel placed 
on the team leader alone resulted in faster communication, 
decision making, and execution of actions. Placing many 
experts on one program team may have resulted in slower 
progress for other programs, but the urgent requirement 
justified this approach. 
The QRAG team approach achieved the streamlined project 
effort and seamless communication goals that is today being 
sought by OSD for ACAT I programs. OSD calls for forming 
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) to " move away from a 
pattern of hierarchical decision making to a process where 
decisions are made across organizational structures by 
Integrated Program Teams". {Ref 21} The IPTs will be 
tailored for the project and will plan and resolve issues at 
the lowest level.  Both approaches result in unity of effort 
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and constant appraisal of program status through development 
and fielding. This higher level of awareness of critical 
issues help ensure for better strategic decisions faster. 
The major difference between the IPTs and the QRAG team is 
that the need for the QRAG team approach was driven by 
urgency while the need for IPTs is driven by large 
reductions in DOD's funding of ACAT I programs. 
The experience of the personnel involved and the 
stability of the civilian workforce greatly contributed to 
the success of this project. The QRAG team members had many 
years of experience in their respective disciplines at the 
same technical position. There was only a very small amount 
of personnel turnover at AVRADA and AERA. The QRAG team 
members knew each other well and were used to working 
together. This provided for a foundation of cooperation and 
understanding of each other's functions, habits, and 
capabilities. This is in contrast to industry where 
turnover is more common and the desire to succeed does not 
always lead to cooperation between experts. 
3.  Government Resources 
The Government's organic capabilities in personnel and 
equipment were a positive force behind the project's 
success. The combination of experienced people and 
Government-owned equipment and facilities set up a "one-stop 
shopping" situation where the user requirement could be met 
locally by experienced people who knew each other well and 
were able to obtain locally the equipment they needed to 
achieve success. The Navigation Van, Rockwell FPRA-3 
antenna, signal generator and spectrum analyzer used in the 
Antenna Radiation Pattern tests are examples of AVRADA owned 
equipment. A Materiel-Developer activity can eliminate its 
organic test capability in favor of relying on outside test 
46 
activities  for  test  facilities,  personnel,  and  other 
required resources.  This approach would reduce fixed costs 
but reduce the flexibility of the Materiel-Developer.  He 
would be locked into using a test range for a specified 
calendar window, after which another activity may be given 
the range and resources.  The Materiel-Developer would have 
to deploy his system and people to this site and may not 
have the time to test-fix-test his system in the allocated 
test window.  A test window at test facilities may not be 
able to adapt schedule even in urgent situations to meet 
Materiel-Developer needs.  The organic test capability in 
AVRADA and AERA provides flexibility to the developer and 
"one stop shopping" to the user.  AERA's organic resources 
include Hangar facilities, different types of helicopters, 
and Government-Furnished Equipment (GFE) on hand that can 
support projects requiring aircraft modification and non- 
standard type aircraft installations.   Lakehurst and Ft. 
Monmouth are only approximately 15 miles apart so movement 
of people and resources could happen quickly if required. 
There is a habitual relationship between AVRADA and AERA, 
where AERA supported AVRADA's needs for system installation 
and testing on aircraft platforms.  This type of requirement 
was common to the QRAG team. Personnel and resources were 
already tailored to meet this type of requirement.  The 
habitual relationship resulted in a higher level of mission 
understanding,  and  unity  of  effort  when  the  urgent 
requirement was tasked. 
4.  Contractor Versus Government Performance 
Outsourcing is a common business practice today where a 
company will contract out for a service or product rather 
than keeping the work in house. Competitive pressures, 
economies of scale on the outside, and strategic goals may 
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make this course of action desirable.  The Report of the 
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, May 
24,  1995,{Ref  22}  believes  that  the Government  should 
"outsource activities that need not be performed in the 
government and reengineer activities that must remain in the 
government to protect the public interest".  The report also 
states, " More than a quarter of a million DOD employees 
engage in commercial type activities that could be performed 
by  competitively  selected  private  companies".{Ref  22} 
Industry  can provide  engineering  services,  pilots,  and 
special equipment needed for non-standard installations and 
testing.  Industry may also be able to provide these needs 
at a lower price to the Government.   Competition between 
corporations for a multi-year support contract to develop 
and  integrate  systems  onto  helicopters  may  result  in 
aggressive proposals and a lower price to the Government. 
Government owned facilities and equipment can be used to 
increase competition where normally the high capital costs 
would impede new competitors  from entering the market. 
Contracting incentives can be used to affect contractor 
behavior so he will control costs and increase quality of 
performance. 
A weakness of this approach is demonstrated in the area 
of navigational systems. Navigational systems are used by 
pilots for position identification, altitude, airspeed, 
estimated time to arrival and to provide other needed 
navigation information. Navigational equipment is used by 
both commercial and military aircraft but the mission 
environment is not the same. Commercial aviation moves 
large numbers of people at high altitudes long distances in 
a non-hostile environment. Military helicopters fly very 
low, in good and bad weather, in hostile environments. 
Antenna installation on helicopters is much more difficult 
to accomplish compared to commercial aircraft because of 
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lack of space for antenna installation and the many other 
radios and complex electrical systems that may interact and 
impact on navigation reception.    Reliance on contractor 
support for aircraft system integration would result in the 
Government losing the institutional knowledge gained by 
employees in stable job positions for long periods of time. 
The institutional knowledge gained by a long time contractor 
may be lost if a later contract is awarded to a different 
company.    Additionally many contractors, or a prime with 
various subcontractors,  would be needed to capture the 
various  engineering,   testing,   and  flight  operations 
performed by the Government at AVRÄDA and AERA.   The 
addition  of  more  management  tiers  from  prime  and 
subcontractors may weaken communications effectiveness and 
increase coordination difficulties in achieving unity of 
effort  between  Government,   prime,   and  subcontractor 
personnel  for  large  complex projects.    The prime and 
subcontractors may not want to fully cooperate with each 
other because even though they are working together on this 
Government contract, they may be competitors for others. 
This may lead to the Government receiving less than best 
efforts from contractor support in meeting Government needs. 
Ideas that may result in technological breakthroughs may not 
be shared with the Government if proprietary utilization of 
the breakthrough will result  in greater profit  in the 
commercial  market.    This  is  especially  possible  for 
navigational systems and GPS.  These systems provide utility 
as navigational aids not only to the military but also  for 
commercial planes, boats, recreational uses, and possibly 
automobiles in the future.  There could be behavior focused 
on  current  and  future profit  which may  conflict  with 
Government desired behavior from contractors.  A less than 
optimal design with respect to cost and performance may be 
recommended to the Government because of the engineering 
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changes that could be later added and logistical support 
required downstream. Frequently changing project demands 
may increase the Government workload to administer, modify, 
and maintain oversight of the various contracts. There 
would also be disruptions if a newly let contract was 
awarded to someone other than the incumbent. The GFE 
inventory required of the thousands of pieces of tooling and 
special equipment would disrupt operations and burn large 
amounts of Government and contractor time. A non-incumbent 
awarded contract may result in large personnel turnover and 
the loss of critical institutional knowledge unique to 
installing navigational equipment on aircraft. Finally, 
contract award can cause a protest that may require a stop 
work action or re-solicitation' that can cause work 
disruptions, confusion, hard feelings between Government and 
contractor personnel, and reduce the effectiveness of the 
organization. The motivation behind Government personnel 
behavior include job security, patriotism, and a well-earned 
retirement after many years of dedicated Government service. 
The motivation here is to share information, work together 
and all will succeed. The sharing of information openly, 
trust, endemic of Government service and elimination of 
hierarchical communication channels for an IPT like 
communication channel optimized communications among team 
members. Optimizing communications is essential for 
development programs to capture critical needs in design 
early on rather than making costly engineering changes 
downstream. 
5.  Requirements Definition 
The QRAG team performed successfully in capturing and 
balancing user performance requirements with operator 
considerations.  The one exception to this statement is not 
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conducting early system evaluation of the Trimpack night 
vision operation compatibility.  The Acquisition Department 
of Defense Instruction (DODI)  5000.2 describes the five 
discrete phases an ACAT I program would pass through to 
ensure a disciplined and efficient execution of procurement 
strategy.  {Ref 23}    Phase 0 defines the most promising 
concepts to meet user requirements.   AVRADA already knew 
that the Trimble GPS was the best GPS system to be installed 
on Army aircraft because of the commercial GPS receiver 
evaluations they conducted in 1987  for JPO GPS.   This 
basically fulfilled Phase 0, the concept exploration phase, 
of the Acquisition Life Cycle where the most promising 
concept was already identified to best meet the user need. 
There was no time to conduct studies of other possibilities. 
The prior GPS down-select decision made from the 1987 test 
and evaluation effort allowed the program to start at Phase 
II  Demonstration  and  Validation.    AVPADA  had  a  good 
background for integrating GPS onto aircraft platforms and 
had  already  identified  and  solved  reception  problems 
resulting from installing receivers and antennas on rotary 
wing aircraft.     Modification of  the already existing 
contract with the Air Force and Trimble facilitated a quick 
response  to  additional  GPS  needed.    The  requirements 
analysis broke down the AVRADA-defined requirements into 
smaller pieces that would have to be balanced to achieve 
optimal design.  Success in making the trade-offs between 
these requirements and capturing them in producible designs 
was a major systems engineering achievement.  The compressed 
development strategy created by the QRAG team and put to 
calendar  schedule  provided  a  disciplined  approach  that 
captured general system engineering critical events required 
for all airframes {App. H} and aircraft unique critical 
events. {App. E}  This published installation development 
plan put all personnel on the "same sheet of music" and was 
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a good metric to assess progress. Laying out the prototype 
plan by aircraft up-front and early on allowed planning to 
begin immediately to ensure critical activities were 
properly resourced in a timely manner. 
6. Concurrency 
This approach combined the Demonstration and Validation 
phase of the Acquisition Life Cycle with the Engineering 
Manufacturing and Development phase. Concurrency was 
essential to ensure all critical activities were completed 
within a tight schedule window. Developing the test plans 
and drawing package concurrently with the aircraft 
modification and kit fabrication and installation was a good 
decision as was developing the Modification Work Order (MWO) 
concurrently with ground and flight tests. {App E} These 
decisions maximized concurrency to speed up program 
completion and shipments of A-Kits to the field. The 
downside was that if major problems were found later, all 
drawings, installation instructions, and previously 
fabricated kits would have to be corrected. 
7. Design Selection 
Recommending the Quick Reaction design over the Stand 
Alone design was a strategic decision that was made early 
on. This decision locked in a technical approach for the 
QRAG team and was the equivalent of a decision to go into 
Phase II, Engineering Manufacturing and Development. The 
advantages of this approach over the Stand Alone approach 
was enhanced reception and reliability gained with an 
external antenna/preamplifier mounted to the roof. The 
Trimpack was out in the desert already and pilots would 
improvise ways to install the system until the approved 
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Quick Reaction team developed installation kit arrived. 
Many pilots "taped it to the dash" {Ref 24} to access the 
critical navigational information the system could provide. 
The engineering change to move the external antenna 
/preamplifier on the UH-1 was a good decision because it 
resulted in better reception, reliability, and utility to 
the user. This was due to the reduced signal masking 
encountered with the antenna/preamplifier mounted to the 
aircraft upper wire cutter rather than the engines hoist 
hole{Fig 3}. 
Situational awareness gained by coordinating with the 
GPS ground control segment to obtain information on GPS 
availability due to satellite visibility was essential for 
effective evaluation of test data. The satellite 
constellation at test time had significant impact on GPS 
accuracy. Knowing this information allowed for AVRADA to 
make effective antenna/preamplifier installation location 
decisions. The decision to relocate the antenna 
/preamplifier to the wire cutter installation may not have 
been made without awareness gained by soliciting information 
on constellation location at test time by AVRADA. AVRADA 
also solicited satellite coverage information for the Desert 
Storm area of operations to understand the GPS availability 
that would be realized by the user. This knowledge would be 
useful to assist in evaluating operator reports of system 
deficiencies if they occurred. AVRADA1s foresight to 
solicit satellite location information was another success 
that assisted in achieving a stable prototype installation 
design and enhanced awareness of system performance. 
AERA supported the planned installation kit prototype 
effort with flexibility to meet AVRADA1s needs and the 
concurrent schedule of events. The aircraft, pilots, 
skilled labor, quality assurance personnel, and GFE 
available on-site made for "one stop shopping" in meeting 
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the aircraft modification, installation kit fabrication, and 
test requirements.  This capability allowed for different 
aircraft to be modified and prepared for flight side-by-side 
allowing for easy re-direction of labor and sharing of 
information.  The Quality Assurance personnel could go down 
the line to inspect aircraft work more easily than if the 
aircraft were dispersed at different locations.   The T&M 
contract made for easy re-direction of work required by 
verbal  notification  from  the on-site  COR to  the DOSS 
supervisor.  This style contract seems especially effective 
for R&D work where exact system requirements definition at 
the micro level is not clear and there are many changes to 
daily contractor utilization.  This contract allows for easy 
expansion of labor capacity by modifying the number of hours 
for desired labor categories yet does not obligate the 
Government to use all the hours.    Pilot input and input 
from  experienced  Quality  Assurance  personnel  helped 
engineers  in  determining  Trimpack  location  within  the 
cockpit.  AERA's large hangar facilities and location by the 
New Jersey "pine barrens" provided enough equipment and test 
air space to conduct ground work and flight tests.   This 
activity provided the core physical capabilities required to 
integrate the various disciplines required to accomplish the 
Quick Reaction project.  The performance by this activity 
was critical in achieving the quick results demanded by the 
installation kit prototype and deployment schedules.  This 
activity is also critical to maintaining the capability of 
the Army to quickly integrate new systems onto aircraft 
platforms  in  a  timely  manner  to  meet  future  user 
requirements. 
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8.  Night Vision Compatibility Problem 
The night vision incompatibility of the Trimpack was 
the greatest problem to be overcome for the QRAG team.  This 
requirement was not  identified early on in the AVRADA 
requirements identification effort.  The decision to ship 
installation kits without this capability utilized a PRE- 
Planned Product Improvement (P3I) strategy.  A system that 
partially met a requirement was fielded to be followed by a 
modification  to  enable  the  system  to  fully meet  the 
requirement.  In the interim, soldiers in the field would 
adapt to cover the display at night with an object and lift 
the object to peek at the display for a short moment to 
obtain navigation information.  The selected snap-on design 
was superior to the initial filter design which required 
four screws to be removed and then installed with the 
filter.  The screws were small and could easily be dropped 
in the aircraft or on the sand in the desert and lost.  The 
snap-on design is simpler for the user to install or remove 
the filter.  This is important because with the NBC threat 
in the desert the operator may not have the dexterity with 
his hands to remove and install these small screws.  The 
operator could be in MOPP IV and would be required to wear 
rubber  gloves  that  would  make  handling  small  objects 
requiring dexterity more difficult.   The snap-on design 
would still allow the operator to install or remove the. 
filter in MOPP IV with little difficulty.   The snap-on 
design was good but the filter design effort did not begin 
until December.   A military aviator with a Level  III 
Acquisition education would have been a valuable member of 
the QRAG team.   He would have an understanding of both 
tactical realities and the acquisition process.  This type 
of person may have identified the Trimpack night vision 
compatibility issue early on and may have identified MOPP IV 
55 
user limitations and champion the snap-on design concept. 
The time lost between August and October and the difficulty 
encountered in finding a filter acceptable for day and night 
operations complicated the problem. 
The quick problem solving and development capability 
gained by having all critical people and assets locally was 
lost in the filter modification development effort. Filter 
testing was conducted at Ft. Belvoir to determine night 
compatibility, Lakehürst N.J for filter day compatibility, 
and the AEL contractor plant in Lansdale PA for filter 
installation design. 
9.  Time Line 
The time required to identify and communicate the 
Government requirement, down-selection of contractors, and 
production and shipping of kits is as follows; On 10 
January 1991 the first filter tests were conducted at Ft. 
Belvoir and determined the Trimpack display NVG 
incompatible. On 15 January 1991 a modified SINCGARS filter 
was tested and deemed ANVIS acceptable. On 7 February 1991 
three manufacturer's proposals were being evaluated for 
filter procurement to be part of AEL's filter installation 
kit and Canadian Marconi was not contracted until 12 
February 1991. The urgency of this period increased with 
Desert Storm beginning in the middle of January. The time 
frame identifying the deficiency (10 January 1991), 
contracting for filters (12 February 1991), with first 
delivery (22 February 1991) is too long. The better course 
of action would have been to issue a letter contract to 
Canadian Marconi on 15 January 1991 when it was demonstrated 
the snap-on filter was ANVIS acceptable, This action may 
have moved the delivery date up one month from the 2 2 
February 1991 date.  This would have eliminated time lost 
56 
soliciting for and evaluating offerors. Obtaining a waiver 
to lock in a supplier sole-source rather than competing out 
a contract would have allowed the contractor to get started 
faster. This makes sense in light of the lack of market 
information on supplier capabilities and the existing urgent 
requirement. The lack of market information on the 
capabilities of industry to provide ANVIS compliant filters 
under short notice was a major unknown. Market survey 
information needs to be collected to understand the 
capabilities of industry and must be updated regularly. 
Market information on materials that facilitate night vision 
compatibility for commercial navigational equipment is 
especially important because of its possible use as NDI on 
tactical aircraft. The utility of NDI is usually obvious 
but the actions and materials required to adapt the NDI for 
tactical uses are not always easy to capture. The addition 
of a military aviator, acquisition education level III, 
market survey filter information, and an immediate sole- 
source filter procurement decision would have made a 
significant positive impact on timely filter installation 
prototype completion. 
C.  CUSTOMER SATISFACTION ASSESSMENT 
Customer reaction to the Trimble GPS use on Army 
aircraft to provide precise navigational information was 
overwhelmingly positive. There was no quantitative survey 
conducted to support this assessment but after action 
reports and user testimonials do support this conclusion. 
{Ref 26} Desert Storm began with Army AH-64 Attack 
Helicopters destroying two IRAQI early warning radar 
sites.{Ref 25} Destroying these sites was critical so IRAQI 
air defenses would not be alerted to future Coalition 
sorties against them.   Two GPS equipped MH-53 Pave Low 
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helicopters from the Air Forces 20th Special Operations 
Squadron, led four Apache helicopters, from the 101st Air 
Assault Division, under enemy radar to their initial points 
(IPs) of attack that were marked with chem-lights.  Previous 
reconnaissance had identified the location of the enemy 
sites and the locations were programmed onto the Apache's 
on-board target acquisition and missile firing computers. 
Exact  enemy location  information was essential  because 
searching would alert them of the Apaches and the advantage 
of surprise would be lost.  An accurate position update over 
the chem-lites to the Apache's organic doppler radar allowed 
for immediate target acquisition and destruction of the 
targets.  A factor that helped General Schwarzkopf approve 
the mission was the ability of GPS to provide precise 
location information to the U.S. pilots. {Ref 25}  The air 
assault conducted by the 101st Air Assault Division during 
the ground war was the largest air assault operation  in 
history.  A pilot testimonial {Ref 26} in the lead aircraft 
complemented the Trimpack's utility in providing extremely 
accurate position information in marginal weather, both day 
and night.   MG Binford Peay, commander of the 101st Air 
Assault Division reinforced this perception stating " GPS 
receivers were the most popular new piece of equipment in 
the  desert"  {Ref  24}.    Attack helicopter  pilots  also 
obtained utility from the Trimpack.  An AH-64 Apache company 
commander stated,  "GPS was the savior!   It was the most 
important thing to anyone out there. . .  I taped it to the 
dashboard and went with it.  If you did not have GPS you 
were screwed." {Ref 24}  The decision by the user to keep 
their Trimpacks rather than turn them in to depot, and the 
decision  by  the  Council  of  Colonels  to  procure  688 
additional A-kits for Trimpack installation exude customer 
satisfaction with the performance of the system and desire 
to have it installed in all aircraft.  AERA's quick reaction 
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to install GPS onto aircraft prior to deploying for 
Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Restore Hope 
demonstrate customer satisfaction and desire for more of 
this capability for use in different operational 
environments. 
Performance and design concerns voiced after the war 
include testimonials with times where the system did not 
track three or more satellites.{Ref 26} This may be due to 
the immature satellite configuration early in the desert 
deployment prior to the launching of additional satellites. 
The user requested that in the future GPS be integrated into 
aircraft flight displays and that it have anti-spoof 
capability. Additionally, AVRADA re-emphasized the need to 
develop better battery sources and emphasize early in design 
minimal power consumption for future systems.{Ref 27} 
Customer feedback from personnel at high and low levels 
acknowledge the success of the Trimpack in providing precise 
position information that local maps and organic 
navigational aids could not. The deployment and 
installation of this NDI system on Army aircraft resulted in 
greater situational awareness and a significant 
technological advantage over the enemy. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter analyzed the strategy, organizational 
approach, key decisions made, and customer satisfaction for 
the GPS installation effort. Areas analyzed included the 
formation of the ORAG team, requirements definition, 
choosing the Quick reaction strategy over the Stand Alone, 
performing the work in-house rather than contracting out, 
system installation use of concurrency, the reaction to the 
night   vision   compatibility   problem,   and   customer 
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satisfaction.    Chapter  V  will  make  conclusions  and 
recommendations based on this analysis. 
60 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The execution of the Quick Reaction strategy was an 
example of successful use of systems engineering to install 
NDI on existing airborne platforms and to meet an urgent 
requirement.   The QRAG team was successful in executing 
their Quick Reaction strategy because they identified and 
performed actions critical to systems engineering in an 
exemplary  manner.    These  actions  include  performing 
requirements analysis, capturing critical factors in design, 
and in integrating efforts by experts from different fields 
synergistically to support an aggressive schedule.   The 
quick identification of requirements, prototype completion, 
and A-K.it production is a systems engineering success. 
Centralized up-front planning,  and detailed requirements 
definition and analysis in an expedient manner allowed more 
time for execution of critical activities. 
A streamlined organizational structure and 
decentralized execution of key events empowered personnel to 
quickly execute events, solve problems, and meet schedule. 
The streamlined QRAG team demonstrates the potential for 
Government teams to perform more efficiently than industry 
if empowered by upper level management to work autonomously 
and make decisions. The institutional knowledge, local 
availability of resources, and streamlined communications 
between AVRADA, AEESA, and AVSCOM reduced the time for 
information to be passed, evaluation of key event results, 
and decision making. 
The QRAG team was empowered by allowing the team to 
make most decisions organically with only strategic and 
resourcing decisions made at higher levels. The urgency 
driven by the war in the desert caused normal stovepipe 
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paradigms for large organizational communications to be 
broken and replaced by the faster vertically and 
horizontally integrated QRAG team.{Figs 1,2} 
The value of having a long term stable Government work- 
force for RDT&E is demonstrated in this study. The 
technical experts achieved synergy without going through the 
growing pains that groups of unfamiliar personnel go through 
when thrown together into a team. The synergy was already 
there from years of habitual support in the area of airframe 
modification, aircraft system integration, and aircraft 
system test. Maintaining Government experts locally in 
engineering, aircraft antenna testing, aircraft structural 
modifications, aircraft electrical modification, pilots, 
aircraft avionics, and production and test capabilities, 
provided an effective personnel mix to complete this 
systems engineering effort. 
Organic physical resources to include flight 
facilities, shop facilities, and test equipment, available 
locally are essential for quicker systems engineering and 
provide one-stop shopping to customers. Having all the 
critical physical resources on-hand locally makes for easier 
planning, execution, communication, and integration of key 
activities. The test capability give a test-fix-test 
capability locally rather than having to deploy to a test 
range and being schedule restricted by a tight test window. 
Installing NDI on aircraft is a valuable niche for AVRADA 
and AEESA. These organizations provide quick, quality 
service to customers and are a valuable asset in evaluating 
potential NDI use on Army aircraft. 
Early RDT&E conducted to select the optimal commercial 
GPS receiver for Army aircraft in 1987 paid off in 1990. 
The work conducted by AVRADA and funded by JPO GPS revealed 
the problem of rotor interference on GPS reception. Trimble 
Navigation solved this problem by developing software on a 
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chip and embedding it within the GPS receiver. The study 
also identified the Trimble Trimpack as the optimal 
commercial GPS receiver for use in Army rotary-wing 
aircraft. The earlier effort to evaluate commercial GPS 
capability on Army aircraft reduced the technical risk of 
the 1990 Quick reaction effort by modifying the Trimble 
receiver to be rotary-wing compatible. The Quick Reaction 
systems engineering effort was supported by having a rotary- 
wing compatible GPS receiver at the start of the Quick 
Reaction project. This saved valuable time and solved the 
rotor signal interference problem that would have caused the 
1990 effort unacceptable schedule delays. The modification 
to the Trimpack GPS receiver would have been a show-stopper 
to the Quick Reaction systems engineering effort, and 
demonstrates the unexpected problems that may be encountered 
when attempting to solve a mission need with an NDI 
strategy. 
Integrating an NDI capability onto a military platform 
may seem simple at the beginning of a platform installation 
or integration effort but later display unforeseen problems. 
The Quick Reaction strategy essentially installed a NDI GPS 
receiver (Trimble Trimpack) onto military airborne 
platforms. Early systems engineering efforts to integrate 
NDI onto military platforms may identify critical 
deficiencies early-on as in the GPS RDT&E effort. Early 
platform installation of NDI will result in identification 
of operator/system interface issues, performance issues, and 
platform physical/functional configuration issues. These 
issues can be addressed with regard to cost risk and 
performance risk to modify the NDI for compatibility in use 
on tactical platforms. Government in-house teams with 
experienced personnel from different disciplines may have 
the institutional knowledge from past efforts to make 
better, faster decisions, and reduce cost and performance 
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risk of NDI platform installations. The quick pace of 
avionics advancement and growth in communications technology 
in general may make commercial NDI tactical use less obvious 
to contracting personnel but clearer to technical expert 
materiel developers. AVRADA's early identification and 
evaluation of commercial GPS receivers gave a snapshot of 
industries' GPS capabilities at that point in time. 
The T&M contract gave the Government the ability to 
continually change priorities without undue administrative 
delays. The contractor was told what to do (not how) and 
responded immediately. The support role during flight 
testing pushed the relationship into day-to- day direction 
as test data revealed new flight requirements and aircraft 
modification requirements. This day-to-day relationship is 
necessary to work as a contractor-Government team in 
aircraft systems installation. This may be a personal 
services relationship, but Government pilots and engineers, 
and contractor system installation personnel and flight 
support personnel have to work extremely closely on complex 
systems engineering efforts. In aircraft systems integration 
the original plan may be consistently modified because of 
unscheduled problems. This was demonstrated when the 
external antenna/preamplifier had to be relocated on the 
wire cutter of the UH-1 to improve signal reception. A team 
that can constantly adapt and improvise is needed to 
complete this type of project. 
Concurrency of critical activities is increased between 
development and production by having the aircraft, people, 
and tools needed under the same roof. Breaking out the 
capabilities to prototype, produce installation kits, . and 
evaluate NDI, to contractors in different geographical 
locations may result in less efficient communications, and 
integration of efforts due to distances between efforts. 
Requirements and key concerns may not be captured early-on 
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in the systems engineering effort if later phase personnel 
are far away. This was demonstrated by the QRAG team 
missing the requirement for a night vision filter until 
later and AEL creating a screw-on design first rather than a 
snap-on design filter. Having key personnel together at the 
start of a systems engineering effort can bring out design, 
production, and support concerns early and avoid the need 
for Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) later. Contracted 
development support and production capabilities vertically 
integrates Government control of a systems engineering 
effort from concept identification through development, 
production, and fielding. 
The customer was satisfied by the product of this 
systems engineering effort. The ultimate measure of the 
success of this NDI strategy is customer satisfaction. The 
decision by Aviation units deployed to the desert to keep 
the Trimpacks in their aircraft combined with positive 
testimonials from tactical users reflect great credit on the 
Quick Reaction GPS installation effort. The Council of 
Colonels decision to procure 688 additional A-Kits for use 
in Army aircraft and the insistence by units to have the 
installation completed prior to deployments in support of 
Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Restore Hope 
validates customer satisfaction with this new capability. 
An NDI strategy using systems engineering disciplines 
to integrate new commercial technology onto military, 
platforms may be the only affordable strategy to modify our 
current platforms to maintain performance superiority over 
future threat systems. The current trend in procurement 
seems to be system modification rather than new system 
procurement. The next war may be a "go-as-you-are-war" with 
no new systems to replace those procured in the eighties due 
to down-sizing and budget constraints. The proliferation of 
technology may rapidly enhance capabilities of military 
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platforms anywhere in the world. Commercial technology used 
by threat forces may reduce our current technological 
superiority and result in an enemy with tactical 
capabilities and situational awareness equal to our own. 
Worldwide proliferation of GPS technology is an example of a 
commercial capability applicable on the battlefield not 
widely available in 1990 but easily available today. The 
Army that most quickly identifies, captures, and 
incorporates commercial technology onto existing tactical 
platforms may have a significant performance advantage over 
their enemy. Small system engineering teams of Government 
technical experts identifying commercial NDI capabilities 
and working with industry support in Government facilities 
to develop optimal platform installations under one roof may 
be the fastest and most affordable method to achieving an 
initial operating capability provided by NDI. 
A waiver to the CONUS contracting officers to award the 
filter procurement contract sole-source and without 
competition should have been given. This would have saved 
time in completing AEL's night vision filter installation 
kit and fielded the kit up to one month quicker. Time was 
the scarcest resource in this effort and evaluating offerors 
for a competitive buy takes too long in this scenario. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The capability to install and integrate systems onto 
aircraft should not be outsourced to industry. The optimal 
design of NDI installation kits and assessment of NDI for 
military use has been demonstrated to be responsive when 
conducted by the Government in this study. Sub-optimal NDI 
strategy and execution may occur if NDI systems engineering 
efforts were controlled by industry. The scope of this 
effort requires large  facilities and personnel of many 
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disciplines. Contracting out this service may result in 
spreading out the technical disciples geographically to 
perform these functions at the location the contractor deems 
best. This systems engineering effort works better when the 
activities are performed by a team of personnel at local 
facilities. Breaking out functions geographically will 
increase the performance risk and schedule risk of the 
systems integrator as demonstrated by the night vision 
compatibility problem. Industry complements Government R&D 
management when used in the support role and in providing a 
limited production capability. The support provided by DOSS 
personnel using GFE, facilities, and flexibility inherit in 
the T&M contract ensured timely development and production 
support. 
An Acquisition Officer with a level III acquisition 
education should be part of military platform system 
installation or integration efforts. The late 
identification of the night vision compatibility deficiency 
shows the importance of having personnel with a tactical 
background together with an understanding of systems 
engineering. An Acquisition Officer with a level III 
acquisition education would understand the acquisition 
process and the tactical concerns that are critical to be 
captured early in a system's design. A person with this 
background will be a valuable member to any systems 
engineering effort that involves integrating NDI onto a 
current tactical platform. 
The Government needs a mechanism to identify evolving 
commercial capabilities and data-base to record the off-the- 
shelf technology. The information search should look- at 
current and future requirements and technology that can 
improve existing platforms. Capturing a commercial 
capability and modifying it to meet a military need without 
a requirement sounds like gold-plating  but if the RDT&E 
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effort to select the best airborne GPS receiver was not 
accomplished in 1987; there would not have been time in 1990 
to find and install a receiver on all the airframes in the 
desert fleet. The gold-plating of today may meet the 
requirement of tomorrow. Recording commercial capabilities 
and the companies with the capability to provide them in a 
central data-base will result in a single source that can be 
referred to when a requirement creates the need to modernize 
old platforms or build new ones. The data-base must be 
continuously updated. Market surveys need to be conducted 
to identify commercial equipment made by the military 
industry and non-military industry. The Government 
technical experts are the best choice to conduct market 
surveys. The market survey may be used as a tool to find 
NDI that meet a mission need installed on a platform or used 
as a stand alone system. NDI may also be identified that 
can inexpensively add value but not respond to a specific 
requirement. The personnel conducting the market survey 
should be the same people who have the institutional 
knowledge to integrate this type of NDI onto military 
platforms. Understanding the technology is critical to 
assessing potential NDI military applications and 
identifying possible platform interface problems. 
The prohibited personal services relationship between 
Government and contractor personnel should be waived for 
systems engineering efforts that require Government and 
contractor personnel to work as a team. This will remove a 
unnecessary barrier and add value by increased unity of 
effort. Day-to-day direction is necessary in complex 
aircraft system integration efforts that result in constant 
plan modification to new problems that arise. 
Procuring activities need to ensure the mechanism 
exists to quickly give Contracting Officers a waiver to 
allow them to award contracts sole-source to meet urgent 
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requirements. Justification and Approvals (J&As) take time 
to create and get approved. In urgent requirements, time is 
the most valuable resource and contracting officer actions 
should not be a show stopper in completing and fielding a 
system. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
An area for further research may be to evaluate the 
efficiency in getting completed GPS installation kits from 
CONUS depots to the user units. This systems engineering 
effort is not of much value if the end product cannot be 
moved quickly overseas and then sorted and distributed to 
the units that have the requirement for installed airborne 
GPS receivers. The fact that 80 of the 425 UH/1 GPS 
installation kits shipped overseas were still available 
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